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Introduction
Currently a large share of the European Union (EU) budget 
is directed toward two policies with different implications 
at territorial level. The fi nancial resources of the Cohesion 
Policy (CP)1 represent about one third of the total EU budget 
while the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) accounts for 
over 40%. The main operational tools of Cohesion Policy 
are the Structural Funds (SF) whose aim is reducing regional 
disparities in terms of income, wealth and opportunities. On 
the other hand, the CAP has a more sectoral focus and is con-
fi gured with an only partial spatial dimension (EC, 2010), 
despite the fact that since 1992 it increased its effects on the 
cohesion process. This means that the territorial impacts of 
these policies could be asymmetric, not allowing overcom-
ing of territorial disparities.
In considering the distribution of CAP subsidies we 
should take into account that ‘growth in poorer regions is 
greatly hampered by an unfavourable industrial structure 
(dominated by agriculture)’ (Cappelen et al., 2003, p.640) 
and that according to Montresor and Pecci (2008) in some 
regions CAP subsidies were far higher than those of the CP 
and focused mainly in the more developed regions. Loosely 
speaking the issue consists of choosing if the distribution 
CAP subsidies must follow criteria based on effi ciency or 
on equity.
Starting from these previous fi ndings, the main objective 
of this study is to answer this question: how effective has the 
EU regional development policy supported by the SF and the 
CAP been in promoting economic growth and in fostering 
the convergence of EU regions?
It should be recalled that in 1989, when the EU CP began, 
there were strong doubts about its effectiveness. These low 
expectations were mainly related to the poor performances 
of regional development policies carried out in the Member 
States (MS) and to the fear that the less developed areas 
1  Cohesion Policy in the study stands for Regional Policy.
would not be able to sustain the competition levels of the 
core areas of the EU (Rumford, 2000; Leonardi, 2006).
In spite of these initial hesitancies, it is objective that ‘a 
strong overall regional convergence has taken place in the 
EU in the last 25 years, in the EU-15 only until the end of 
the 1990s, with a change of trend since then, in the EU-27 
between 2001 and 2005. In the current decade employment 
rates have been slowly converging in both areas, while pro-
ductivity of labour has converged only in the EU-12 area’ 
(Barca, 2009, p.105).
It is still diffi cult to sustain that economic growth was 
induced from CP rather than from other factors, consider-
ing that the effects of CP were not uniform among regions 
with similar economic conditions. In any case, CP helped 
to change the nature of European integration: from an inte-
gration based mainly on the creation of the single market, 
it allowed integration based on mutual solidarity. Another 
important contribution is linked to the rediscovery of the ter-
ritorial dimension rather than sectoral one. Nevertheless in 
the Fourth Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (EC, 
2007), the European Commission (EC) points out (p.x) that 
‘In spite of this [economic] progress [of less developed 
regions], absolute disparities remain large. This is partly as 
a result of recent enlargement and partly as growth tends to 
concentrate – during the initial phases of development – in the 
most dynamic areas within countries’. These doubts about 
the effectiveness of CP are also reported by Barca (2009) 
when emphasising the necessity to modify the CP.
In our work we adopt the β-convergence model proposed 
by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and by Mankiw et al. 
(1992) for evaluating the effects of SF and CAP subsidies 
on the convergence of labour productivity in 204 NUTS2 
EU-15 regions2, between 1995 and 20063. This model sug-
2  The regions in the sample are shown in Appendix.
3  In the database of the European Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) the 
information on subsidies at regional level is incomplete before 1995. This is the reason 
why the beginning of the analysed period does not coincide with 1994, the starting year 
of the second operational period of SF.
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gests that the regions with lower values of productivity grow 
faster than those with higher values (less developed regions 
would catch up with more advanced regions): this implies 
a negative correlation between growth rates of productivity 
and the initial levels of this variable. This model has some 
limitations related to its inability to manage both structural 
heterogeneity of the economies (Durlauf et al., 2005) and the 
spatial dependence (Baumont et al., 2003), that can be over-
come using a methodology based on spatial fi lters (Griffi th, 
2008).
To exceed the limited capacity of this cross-country 
regression model to take into account structural heterogene-
ity, we use a model that can be considered a generalisation of 
the model proposed by Solow (1956) in which each country/
region follows this model, but their aggregate production 
functions are free to change (Brock and Durlauf, 2001). As a 
consequence, the steady states are free to vary across regions 
without imposing a preliminary hypothesis about the type of 
convergence (absolute, conditional or clubs).
The inclusion of spatial fi lters, derived from a spatial 
weights matrix, is able to manage both spatial correlation in 
residuals and spatial interaction among variables and then 
the spatial spillovers effects (Griffi th, 2003). In addition, this 
spatial econometric tool allows estimating regional param-
eters that are decomposable into a global trend effect and 
a local one. In this way we obtain a double indication: the 
general impact of the variables (shown by their coeffi cients 
like in classic ordinary least square – OLS – output) and a 
regionally targeted effect (a local and univocal coeffi cient). 
This represents a decisive step forward for understand-
ing and assessing the specifi c effects of public policies on 
growth and socio-economic dynamics.
For evaluating the effects of CP on the convergence pro-
cess of European regions, we utilise a quasi-experimental 
design, the Regression Discontinuity (RD), to compare 
the results of policy interventions, in terms of regional 
β-convergence rates (the output of the spatial fi ltering 
model), with a ‘counterfactual’ scenario to estimate what 
would have happened in the absence of such interventions.
In order to give a better contextualisation of our results, 
we highlight some signifi cant outcomes of previous studies 
on convergence of European regions. A fi rst set does not 
consider the spatial dimension of the regional economies. 
Among these, Cuadrado-Roura (2001) tested the hypothesis 
that regions with an initial level of GDP per capita below 
the EU average had an above-average growth rate in the 
period 1977-1994. The estimated convergence rate was 
less than 2%. López-Bazo (2003) reached similar results 
examining the period 1975-1996. Among the authors whose 
aim is to verify the conditional convergence, Fagerberg and 
Verspagen (1996), Cappelen et al. (2003) and Geppert et al. 
(2005) detected a low or absence of the convergence process, 
while Neven and Gouyette (1995), considering two differ-
ent regimes for northern and southern EU regions, found a 
signifi cant convergence rate. Basile et al. (2001) identifi ed 
a signifi cant convergence process; fi nally Martin (2001) 
distinguished various groups of regions among Objective 1 
regions, in different sub-periods. 
The most recent contributions take into account the spa-
tial dimension (Baumont et al., 2003; Fischer and Stirböck, 
2005; Dall’Erba and Le Gallo, 2006; Arbia et al., 2010). The 
inclusion of spatial effects causes a reduction of the estimated 
speed of the global convergence process to be reduced, but it 
highlights that the speed of convergence is higher in the EU’s 
poorest regions.
Some authors adopted the β-convergence model to anal-
yse the effect of CP on convergence. Cappelen et al. (2003) 
found that the 1988 reform of SF increased its effectiveness 
in the poorest regions. Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) 
examined how SF support was allocated among different 
development axes in Objective 1 regions for the period 1989-
1999. They found no signifi cant impact of SF on infrastruc-
tures or business support, while investment in human capital 
had medium-term positive effects and support for agriculture 
had short-term positive effects on growth.
Ederveen et al. (2006) attempted to assess the effi cacy of 
SF following the approach proposed by Burnside and Dollar 
(2000). Their fi ndings pointed to the absence of a globally 
signifi cant impact of SF on regional growth but the support 
allocated in the regions with high quality of institutions was 
effective, leading to the conclusion that SF are conditionally 
effective. Dall’Erba and Le Gallo (2007) included the spa-
tial effects in the estimation of a conditional β-convergence 
model, analysing separately each of the fi ve SF objectives. 
The results indicate that their impact was insignifi cant, very 
small and even, in some cases, negative. In particular, sup-
port under Objective 1 was found to have a positive impact 
in the core regions but an insignifi cant one in the peripheral 
regions.
Among the few authors who considered the impact of 
CAP subsidies in the estimation of the convergence process 
of EU regions, we recall Esposti (2007) who assessed the 
consistency of CAP measures with Objective 1 funds for 
the period 1989-2000. This study found a positive impact 
of Objective 1 funds on the convergence process of 206 EU 
Regions and that CAP expenditure did not have a counter-
treatment effect, although its positive impact on growth was 
in fact negligible.
The economic and social cohesion in the EU has become 
even more important since the accession of Spain and Por-
tugal in 1986 and the adoption of the programme to com-
plete the internal market in 1992. The necessary fi nancial 
resources for achieving the objectives were obtained through 
the SF reform. This reform, completed at the end of 1988, 
identifi ed fi ve objectives to assist the least-favoured regions 
and to reduce disparities in development in comparison with 
the most advanced regions.
Objective 1 consisted in promoting the development and 
structural adjustment of the regions whose development 
was lagging behind; Objective 2 aimed to convert declining 
industrial regions; The goals of Objective 3 were combat-
ing long-term unemployment; the target of Objective 4 was 
facilitating the occupational integration of young people; 
that of Objective 5a was speeding up the adjustment of agri-
cultural structures, while with Objective 5b the intent was 
promoting the development of rural areas. Objective 1 and 
other Objectives were mutually exclusive. SF were allocated 
within operational periods: the fi rst running from 1989 to 
1993, the second from 1994 to 1999, the third from 2000 to 
2006 and the fourth from 2007 to 2013. During the second 
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period the Objective 6 (sparsely populated area) was added. 
The Agenda 2000 agreement reduced the objectives from six 
to three. Objective 1 was unchanged, while the new Objec-
tive 2 brought together the former Objectives 2 and 5b. In 
our work we consider only the regionally targeted Objec-
tives: 1, 2 and 5b for the second period and Objectives 1 and 
2 for the third period4.
The absolute value of the resources in millions of Euro 
(MECU) for each country in the two considered program-
ming periods are shown in Figure 1. Naturally the SF 
increased signifi cantly in MS with Objective 1 regions: 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, but, excluding 
for Objective 1, they represented a very small percentage of 
GVA.
The total CAP subsidies considered in the study5 are 
shown in Figure 2. The MS that received the largest shares of 
subsidies, in absolute terms, were in order: France, Germany, 
UK and Italy. Generally the amounts of CAP subsidies were 
50% bigger than SF. Therefore, at least for the amount of 
devoted resources, the role of CAP support cannot be con-
sidered separately from CP support in evaluating regional 
development.
The paper is organised as follows: in the next section we 
describe the empirical and spatial models, and in the follow-
ing one the estimation result. In the fi nal section we discuss 
the application of the Discontinuity Regression.
The empirical and spatial model
In our work we estimate the convergence process on 
labour productivity by the well-known cross-sectional 
β-convergence model defi ned as follows (Durlauf et al., 
2005):
  (1)
4  The SF for Objective 2 and 5b, when assigned at national level, were reassigned 
to eligible regions on the base of their population.
5 In our study we consider the value of total subsidies, extracted from Standard Re-
sult database, that are contained in the variable SE605 of the European FADN. In 
particular the variable SE 605 covers total subsidies – European and national, I and II 
pillar of the CAP, coupled and decoupled – excluding subsidies on investments. 
where α represents the constant term, i is the region index, yi0 
is the initial productivity level (GVA_EMP95) (the variables 
are described in Table 1), yit is the fi nal productivity level 
(GVA_EMP06), and Z is a matrix of explanatory variables. β 
is the so called convergence coeffi cient, φ is the vector of the 
parameters and ε the i.i.d. error term6.
The parameter β is expected to be negative and approxi-
mates the speed of convergence towards the steady state: less 
productive regions should grow faster than more produc-
tive. The inclusion of the set of control variables (Z) in the 
model (1) tests the conditional β-convergence hypothesis, 
which takes place if each region reaches its own steady state, 
converging in the long run to different levels of per worker 
6  The data about GVA, employment and investment are taken from Cambridge 
Econometrics’ database, while data about lifelong learning participants from Eurostat 
Regio. Data on Funds allocation are taken from EC (1995a, 1995b, 1999 and 2006).
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Figure 1: Amount of Structural Funds (Objectives 1, 2, 5b) per EU 
Member State (MECU).
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Figure 2: Amount of Common Agricultural Policy funding per EU 
Member State (MECU).
Table 1: The variables entered in the models.
Variable Description
GVA_EMP06i logarithm of local rate of GVA per worker in 2006
GVA_EMP95i logarithm of local rate of GVA per worker in 1995
DISC_GVA i logarithm of local rate of employment growth (mean be-
tween 1995 and 2006) + 0.03
INV_GVAi logarithm of local rate of investment on GVA (mean be-
tween 1995 and 2006) as proxy of saving rate
EMP_AGRIi logarithm of local rate of employment on agriculture on 
total employment (mean between 1995 and 2006)
EMP_SERVi logarithm of local rate of employment on services on to-
tal employment (mean between 1995 and 2006)
LL_LEARi logarithm of workers participating in lifelong learning 
programmes on total workers (mean between 1995 and 
2006) 
OB1_GVAi logarithm of yearly average local level of Objective 1 
Fund for the whole period divided by the level of GVA at 
the beginning of the period
OB2-5_GVAi logarithm of yearly average local level of Objective 2 
Fund for the whole period plus Objective 5b Fund for 
period 1994-1999 divided by the level of GVA at the be-
ginning of the period
SUBS_GVAi logarithm of yearly average local level of CAP subsidies 
for the whole period divided by the level of GVA at the 
beginning of the period
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output. As in Mankiw et al. (1992), we included in Z the 
physical capital investment rates (INV_GVA) and the term 
DISC_GVA to take into account the variable (n+g+δ), where 
n is the employment growth, g the technological progress, 
and δ the depreciation rate. As suggested by Mankiw et al. 
(1992) we fi xed g+δ equal to 0.03 while we estimated n.
In our cross-section growth models (with and without 
SF and CAP subsidies), in addition to mentioned variables, 
we added some control variables related to the social fi lter 
(Crescenzi et al., 2007) able to catch the structures of the 
regional economies. These variables are somehow connected 
to the SF and CAP subsidies, as they depict the ‘state of the 
economy’ where the policy instruments are implemented. 
We considered the share of services employment (SERV_
EMP) and agricultural employment (AGRI_EMP) to capture 
respectively the sector with higher and lower productivity. 
We also included the participants of lifelong learning pro-
grammes (LL_LEAR) for representing both the degree of 
accumulation of knowledge and the human capital invest-
ment rate.
We estimated two models (where the parameters are free 
to vary locally) specifi ed as follows:
1 - Base model: 
(GVA_EMP06i - GVA_EMP95i )/12 = α + βGVA_EMP95i + φ1DISC_GVAi + φ2INV_GVAi + φ3EMP_AGRIi + φ4EMP_SERVi + φ5LL_LEARi + εi 
2 - Base model + SF + CAP subsidies: 
(GVA_EMP06i - GVA_EMP95i )/12 = α + βGVA_EMP95i + φ1DISC_GVAi + φ2INV_GVAi + φ3EMP_AGRIi + φ4EMP_SERVi + φ5LL_LEARi + εi + φ6OB1_GVAi + φ7OB2-5_GVAi + φ8SUBS_GVAi + εi 
For implementing the spatial fi ltering model stated 
above we need to specify a spatial weights matrix able to 
take into account the institutional, socio-economic and spa-
tial relations among regions. This kind of matrix is a way 
to model the externalities as conceived by Krugman (1991). 
Our spatial weights matrix is based on a Gravity Model Indi-
ces (Keeble et al., 1981, 1988) because using this indica-
tor we are able to take into account both the distance and 
potential attraction among regions. The infl uence (relative 
economic potential) of a certain region on another, in fact, is 
directly proportional to the product of the economic activity 
(or ‘mass’) of the two regions, and inversely proportional to 
the distance dist (measured in kilometres) separating them. 
In the obtained square matrix every row shows the ‘relative 
economic potentials’ of a determined region with respect to 
the others. The ‘total economic potential’ of each location is 
found by summing by row all the ‘relative economic poten-
tials’. In the study, the mass m for each region is assumed 
to be equal to the log of employment productivity in 1995, 
which is the main variable of the used cross-sectional growth 
model7.
The spatial weights matrix for n regions, with zero on the 
principal diagonal, is defi ned as:
 (2)
The map of the regional economic potential in Figure 3 is 
quite similar to that of Copus (1997). 
The SW matrix is standardized using a W coding-scheme 
(Tiefelsdorf et al., 1999) that keeps the ‘relative economic 
potential’ of every region with respect to the others standard-
izing them by row. Testing the presence of spatial autocor-
relation among variables using Moran’s test we can exclude 
the classical assumption of independence of observations for 
each variable (Tiefelsdorf and Griffi th, 2007), justifying the 
choice of using spatial fi ltering technique, through which 
we can restore the assumption of independence of observa-
tions for each variable. While Getis’ spatial fi lters (1995) 
separately fi lter each variable splitting its spatial component 
from the non-spatial one, our spatial fi lters model is based 
exclusively on the spatial weights matrix and on its Moran 
Coeffi cient (MC) defi ned as:
 (3)
where i and j refer to different spatial units (i.e. cell cen-
troids) of which there are n, and y is the data value in each. 
The right side of equation (3) represents the matricial form 
of MC where  is the matrix in which I is the 
7  Keeble et al. (1981, 1988) chose GDP or GDP in PPS like mass variable. In our 
case, we chose the log GVA per worker in 1995 like mass because it is the main vari-
able of the growth model.
Figure 3: Economic potential of the location according to Gravity 
Model Indices used in our model (EU NUTS2 regions).
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identity matrix of size n-by-n, 1 is a vector of one dimension 
n-by-1 and the superscript t points the transposed matrix. 
The peculiarity of the M matrix is that it centres the vector of 
data value Y.
Tiefelsdorf and Boots (1995) demonstrate that each of 
the n eigenvalues of expression 
M(SW)M (4)
is a MC value, once it is multiplied by the left-hand term of 
expression (3), namely 
This allows the extraction from the n-by-n matrix of 
uncorrelated orthogonal components (Tiefelsdorf and 
Boots, 1995). This nonparametric approach has the aim of 
managing the presence of spatial autocorrelation by intro-
ducing a set of variables, the eigenvectors, able to catch the 
latent spatial association of georeferenced variables (Getis 
and Griffi th, 2002). A set of candidate eigenvectors, that 
can be selected from the n eigenvectors on the basis of their 
MC values exceeding a pre-fi xed threshold value of 0.25 
(Griffi th, 2003), can be used as predictors instead of not 
explicitly considered variables (Fischer and Griffi th, 2008). 
In our case the candidate eigenvectors with MC > 0.25 are 
27. Since the eigenvectors are both orthogonal and uncor-
related, a stepwise linear regression can be used to achieve 
this end.
The spatial model used is a transformation of the GWR 
model (Fotheringham et al., 2002) proposed by Griffi th 
(2008). The model exploits the spatial fi lters through the 
construction of a new set of variables created by the product 
between the spatial fi lters and the spatial variables.
In a regression model where Y is a n-by-1 vector that rep-
resents the dependent variable, βj is the i_th regression coef-
fi cient and ε is an n-by-1 vector of the random error terms, 
the linear model with spatial fi lters incorporates a set P of 
regressors, Xp = (p = 1,2, ..., P), with a k set of selected 
eigenvectors, Ek = (k = 1,2, ..., K), which represent different 
spatial models, in order to consider the residual spatial auto-
correlation in the dependent variable and has the following 
form:
 (5)
where ● denotes element-wise matrix multiplication (i.e. 
Hadamard matrix multiplication), and each k identifi es the 
eigenvector numbers that describe the attribute variable p, 
with K being the total number of these vectors. The regres-
sion coeffi cients, like in OLS model, stand for global val-
ues while the eigenvectors represent local modifi cations of 
global values. The fi rst two terms (i.e. the global attribute 
variable coeffi cients) are multiplied by the vector 1, which 
also is a spatial fi lter eigenvector. More precisely, the global 
values are the coeffi cients needed to construct linear com-
binations of the eigenvectors, in order to obtain GWR-type 
coeffi cients. The sum of the fi rst and third terms corresponds 
to the GWR intercept while the sum of the second and of 
the fourth elements represents the local parameters of the 
variables. Estimation of equation (5) needs to be followed 
by collecting all terms containing a common attribute vari-
able and then factoring it out in order to determine its GWR 
coeffi cient. The GWR coeffi cients are linear combinations of 
a subset of the K eigenvectors, with those not in the subset 
having a regression coeffi cient value of 0; the GWR coef-
fi cients are n-by-1 vectors.
Estimation results
The global values (i.e. the average of parameters esti-
mated for each region (local values)) of the parameters esti-
mates for each model8 are presented in Table 2. The conver-
gence rate in model 1 is lower than in model 2: the adding 
of SF and CAP subsidies has a positive impact on the con-
vergence process, by increasing signifi cantly the global con-
vergence rate, even if the values of their parameters are very 
low. In both models a negative and signifi cant coeffi cient is 
associated to the variables DISC_GVA and LL_LEAR, while 
EMP_SERV has a positive and signifi cant coeffi cient. The 
capital depreciation, as expected, negatively affects eco-
nomic growth. The negative sign of the variable that catches 
the participants of lifelong learning programmes could be 
associated to the short term inability to productively employ 
high skilled workers. In the more developed regions the 
investments in lifelong learning are higher but, following 
8  Table 2 shows the values of the coeffi cients of the variables before to add their 
associated eigenvectors.
Table 2: Global parameters of spatial fi ltering models (standard 
errors are shown in parentheses).
Variables Base model Base model+ SF+ CAP subsidies
Intercept 0.0185 0.0344 ***
(-0.0143) (0.0129)
GVA_EMP95 (β) -0.0167 *** -0.0216 ***
(-0.0028) (0.0025)
DISC_GVA -0.0179 *** -0.0141 ***
(-0.0019) (0.0019)
INV_GVA 0.0054 ** -0.00003
(-0.0026) (0.0024)
EMP_AGRI 0.0005 -0.0009
(-0.0005) (0.0006)
EMP_SERV 0.0264 *** 0.0267 ***
(-0.0030) (0.0030)
LL_LEAR -0.0045 *** -0.0059 ***
(-0.0008) (0.0009)
OB1_GVA 0.0008 ***
(0.0003)
OB2-5_GVA 0.0002
(0.0002)
SUBS_GVA 0.0010 ***
(0.0004)
Test against heteroskedasticity
Studentized
Breusch-Pagan test 65.4328 44.249
Spatial autocorrelation of residuals
Moran’s I 0.2926 0.5153
Fit
R-squared (adj.) 0.9163 
(0.8742)
0.9251
(0.8873)
Residual Std. errors 0.0034 0.0032
AIC -1686.539 -1709.072
Signifi cance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
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the Solovian model, these regions grow more slowly, hence 
the negative value of the parameter. The ratio of employ-
ment in services sector has a positive and signifi cant impact 
on economic growth, increasing the convergence rate. The 
SF for Objectives 1 and CAP subsidies are also positive 
and signifi cant, while the SF for Objectives 2 and 5b are 
not signifi cant. As shown in the introduction, the resources 
for Objectives 2 and 5b were very low and this may be the 
reason for their lack of effectiveness in terms of economic 
growth.
The impact on the convergence process of the CAP sub-
sidies is a little greater than Objective 1 funds. This result is 
rather surprising and should be deeply investigated taking 
into account the structure of regional economies.
The two models show a high fi t with both R2 above 0.90 
and a low Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and resid-
ual sum of square (RSS). These indicators show a strong 
improvement in comparison with the OLS estimation (for 
each model the R2 are about 0.40 and the AIC are higher). 
Furthermore, the residuals, in both models are not normally 
distributed9, not spatially autocorrelated and homogeneous.
The dominant geographic scale of the collected eigen-
vectors associated with each variable gives us its geographic 
scale (Table 3). The sets of eigenvectors connected with the 
independent variables have mainly a local scale; the only 
exceptions are EMP_SERV and LL_LEAR in model 2 with 
a clear regional scale.
The local values, by quintile, of the local β-convergence 
rates are in Figures 4 and 5. In both models the macro-regions 
with similar values of rates of convergence do not coincide 
9  It is interesting to observe that the used spatial weights matrix is able to weigh the 
regression eliminating hetehoskedasticity. Using other spatial weights matrix it often 
happens that only spatial autocorrelation is corrected while the problem of non-homo-
geneity of error terms is not solved.
with the national boundaries emphasising the uniformity 
among neighbouring regions rather than within MS. In the 
two models the distribution of convergence rates among 
regions changes: while in the base model the regions with 
higher convergence rates do not coincide with the Objective 
1 regions, in model 2 it happens; the only exception involves 
the Scandinavian regions which had already reached a high 
development level in 1995.
The density kernel of the local parameter of conver-
gence is in Figure 6. In model 2 the top peak corresponds 
to higher convergence rates than in model 1. However we 
observe a double peak confi guration mainly in model 1 
in correspondence to 1% of divergence. In model 2 a just 
evident peak corresponds to a convergence rate of roughly 
0.7% and 5%.
Table 3: Selected eigenvectors associated with the explanatory 
variables of each model.
Variables
Eigenvectors associated to explanatory variables
Global scale 
(MC > 75)
Regional scale 
(75 > MC > 50)
Local scale 
(50 > MC > 25)
from eig. 1 to 4 from eig. 5 to 11 from eig. 12 to 27
Base model
Intercept E1 E8 E13, E23
GVA_EMP95 (β) - E8 E26
DISC_GVA E1 E10 E12, E26
INV_GVA - E5, E10 E17, E20, E21, E23, 
E25, E26
EMP_AGRI E1, E2, E3 E7, E8 E14, E17, E21, E25, 
E27
EMP_SERV E1 E5, E11 E16, E20, E21, E22
LL_LEAR - E5, E7, E10, E11 E12, E16, E20, E23
Base model + SF + CAP subsidies
Intercept E2 - -
GVA_EMP95 (β) - E7 E13, E18, E23
DISC_GVA E1, E2 - E18, E26
INV_GVA E2 - E23, E25
EMP_AGRI E2 E8, E11 E18, E25, E26, E27
EMP_SERV E1 E11, E12 -
LL_LEAR - E5, E7, E11 -
OB1_GVA - E6, E7 E23, E24
OB2-5_GVA E3 - E21, E23, E27
SUBS_GVA - E6, E11 E18, E24, E26
Figure 4: Spatial distribution by quintile ranges of the local 
β-convergence rates of GVA per worker in the Base model (EU 
NUTS2 regions).
Figure 5: Spatial distribution by quintile ranges of the local 
β-convergence rates of GVA per worker in the Base model + SF + 
CAP subsidies (EU NUTS2 regions).
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The Regression Discontinuity analysis
As already seen, the previous analyses on the effective-
ness of EU Regional Policy for reducing gaps among EU 
regions, are unable to reach unambiguous conclusions. This 
depends on several factors: different periods covered, dif-
ferent techniques used, different empirical and convergence 
models adopted.
The evaluation of the impact of CP on growth and on 
convergence processes involves considerable methodologi-
cal problems, related both to the availability of time series 
data comparable across countries, and to the diffi culty of 
estimating the counterfactual hypothesis, that is the eco-
nomic growth achieved in the absence of the Objective 1 SF. 
In addition, it is not easy to separate the effects of the other 
factors infl uencing growth.
As argued by Morton (2009) a counterfactual analysis 
is essential to identify the effects on regional economies of 
the EU policies. This approach has been little used, espe-
cially when the goal was to compare the Objective 1 regions 
(defi ned as ‘treated’ because they receive the Objective 
1 SF) to non-Objective 1 regions (‘not treated’). A help-
ful technique is the Regression Discontinuity (RD), which 
allows assessing the impact of some policies in case of non-
experimental design, i.e. when it is not possible to conduct 
randomised experiments to determine the effects of these 
policies. The RD estimates the effects of a policy (in our case 
the regional parameter of β-convergence rate, the outcome of 
the model) when the treatment allocation is determined by 
the level of an observed variable (per capita GDP in 1995, 
the forcing variable), and in particular whether or not this 
variable exceeds a certain threshold (cut-off point).
The basic concept of RD is that the average score of the 
subjects (in our study the EU regions) which fall marginally 
above (below) the cut-off point, is a valid comparison for the 
group which falls marginally below (above) the threshold. 
If the association of the forcing variable and the outcome is 
continuous, any discontinuity in the forcing variable at the 
cut-off point can be interpreted as empirical evidence of the 
effect of the random treatment: the presence or absence of 
the Objective 1 SF (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).
The discontinuity in the RD is based only on the rela-
tionship between the outcome and the cut-off point. As a 
result, close to the cut-off point, we may compare the units 
in the treated and untreated groups10. Moreover, this can be 
extended to the regions with probability to be close to the 
cut-off (Lee, 2008). From a methodological point of view, 
the inference on the RD is comparable with the results of 
randomised experiments.
In our analysis the RD approach is used for estimating 
the effects of Regional Policy on the convergence process 
of the EU regions (see Lee and Lemieux (2009) for a survey 
on the RD and its main applications in economics). Regions 
whose per capita GDP is less than 75% of the EU aver-
age (Objective 1) are compared with those above the 75% 
threshold (not eligible for funding); the forcing variable is 
regional GDP per capita, the cut-off point is the 75% thresh-
old and the treatment is EU Objective 1 funds11. Let us here 
remark that, in line with the basic idea of RD, the treatment 
(i.e. the Objective 1 funds) is assumed to depend only on 
whether in region i the level of GDP per capita is below the 
fi xed threshold. This is a case of ‘sharp design’: the treat-
ment only depends on the level of GDP per capita (Imbens 
and Lemieux, 2008).
In our case the hypothesis is that the average outcome 
for regions just above the cut-off point can represent a valid 
counterfactual for those just below the threshold. The com-
parison of the β-convergence rates of regions receiving EU 
funds with that of unassisted regions at the cut-off point 
allows us to identify the locally average policy effect at the 
threshold. Nevertheless, in our analysis, the RD suffers two 
main disadvantages. Firstly, the low number of observations 
close to the threshold determines a trade-off between the size 
of the interval in the neighbourhood of the cut-off point and 
the accuracy of the statistical estimates. Secondly, the con-
vergence rates present a high variability with respect to the 
initial level of the GDP per capita. The limited number of 
observations close to the cut-off point might identify a group 
of regions with features that differ markedly from those of 
unassisted regions, compromising the accuracy of estimates. 
In the light of these problems, at this stage, we only propose 
a graphical analysis.
Lee and Lemieux (2009) argue that a simple way to eval-
uate the effects of the treatment (the presence of Objective 1 
funds) is to plot the relationship between the outcome vari-
able (the regional β-convergence rates) and the forcing vari-
able (the levels of GDP per capita) per region, on either sides 
of the cut-off point. If there is no visual evidence of a dis-
continuity in the graph, it is unlikely that more sophisticated 
regression methods will yield a signifi cant policy effect.
10  Lee (2008) shows that the RD is equivalent to a local random assignment around 
the cut-off.
11  According to this division, 56 regions are below the threshold of 0.75 and 148 
above. For coherence with the previous analysis, the calculation of average GDP in 
PPS was carried out using the Cambridge Econometrics database whose data cannot be 
fully compatible with those used by EU in the determination of the Objective 1 eligible 
regions. According to our calculations 7 of the 56 regions below the threshold were not 
eligible for the Objective 1, while, among the 148 regions above 75% there were 14 
regions: (i) eligible for the Objective 1 only in 2000-2006, (ii) phasing-out in 1994-
1999 or in 2000-2006; (iii) with only part of their territory eligible for the Objective 1.
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The results of the nonparametric technique proposed 
by Bowman et al. (2006) are shown in Figure 7. The 
regional β-convergence rates of the model 2 are plotted 
against the level of GDP per capita (in PPS), average 1988-
199012, standardized with respect to the EU-15 mean value 
(equal to 100). The presence of discontinuity is signifi cant 
(p-value 0.033) at the cut-off point 0.767 (solid line), 
which is very close to 0.75 (dashed line), the separation 
level of ‘treated’ and ‘not treated’ regions. On average, 
regions with GDP per capita less than 0.75 present higher 
β-convergence rates than other EU-15 regions. The exist-
ence of a clear discontinuity at the cut-off point is sup-
ported by the graph. The non-parametric regression line 
shows a negative jump moving from regions with GDP per 
capita less than 0.75 to the ones with GDP per capita above 
the 75 per cent threshold.
Finally, using this division between regions, we calcu-
lated the total SF Objective 1, for the period 1994-2006, per 
1995 inhabitants and the incidence on 1995 total GVA; the 
total of CAP subsidies (I and II pillar), for the period 1995-
2006, per 1995 agricultural employee and the incidence on 
1995 total GVA (Table 4). The two groups of regions are 
characterised mainly by the presence, or absence, of the 
Objective 1 SF, while the CAP subsidies for agricultural 
employment are comparable between the two groups of 
12  To defi ne regions receiving SF the indicator of GDP per capita is measured by 
the EC in the last three years at the time of closing of the negotiations. For the period 
1994-1999, the years were: 1988,1989,1990.
regions, although their impact on total GVA, as expected, is 
much higher in Objective 1 regions.
Discussion
Our study allows some fi nal considerations. In terms of 
β-convergence rates, our results are in line with the ones of 
Ederveen et al. (2006) and show an improvement in compar-
ison with the study of Cappelen et al. (2003). Furthermore, 
the analysis confi rms the results obtained in other recent 
studies (e.g. Arbia et al., 2010). In the period 1995-2006 a 
weak convergence process of labour productivity occurred 
in the 204 EU-15 regions analysed, although with signifi cant 
differences among the European regions.
According to the results of model 2 the relative posi-
tions of the regions in term of convergence rates change with 
respect to model 1: in model with SF and CAP subsidies the 
more economically disadvantaged regions at the beginning 
of the considered period show (with respect to the other 
regions) the highest relative β-convergence rates. This is in 
line with what is suggested in previous studies on the effects 
of CP, in particular Leonardi (2006). In addition to this fi nd-
ing we must add that, with respect to the base model where 
the regions with parameter of β-convergence less than -0.025 
number only 39, in model 2 we observe that all regions with 
GDP per capita lower than 75 (Objective 1 regions) increase, 
in absolute terms, their convergence rates: the 80 regions 
with β-convergence rates less than -0.025 are almost always 
located in peripheral areas of the EU. They include nearly 
all of the Austrian and Belgian regions, a number of Ger-
man regions, especially those belonging to the former DDR, 
many Spanish regions, four regions of France, Irish regions, 
almost all the regions of central and southern Italy, a Dutch 
region, the Portuguese ones and half of the UK regions.
These aspects confi rm the effectiveness of the two sup-
port measures but do not allow to determine which is the most 
appropriate without looking at the regional economic structure.
The number of regions that diverge is notably reduced 
(from 17 to 9) when CAP and SF are included.
Through the Regression Discontinuity approach it is pos-
sible to compare the results of less-favoured regions (mainly 
Objective 1) with those of the most developed. First of all 
Objective 1 regions reached a higher speed of convergence 
but the contribution of SF to the convergence process, in 
relation to regionally targeted Objectives 1, 2 and 5b, is not 
unequivocal. Only Objective 1 SF has a positive and sig-
nifi cant impact, although very limited, while the contribution 
of Objectives 2 and 5b SF is not signifi cant. The absence 
of signifi cance for these SF can be explained by looking 
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Figure 7: A comparison of the β-convergence rates of Objective 1 
and other EU-15 regions (Base model + SF + CAP subsidies).
Table 4: Average incidence in Objective 1 and other EU-15 regions: (i) SF Objective 1 (1994-2006) per inhabitants and as percentage of 
total GVA; (ii) CAP subsidies (1995-2006) per person employed on agriculture and as percentage of total GVA.
Obj. 1 funds 
1994-2006 / inhabit. 1995
CAP subsidies 
1995-2006 / agric. empl. 1995
Obj. 1 funds 
1994-2006 / GDP 1995
CAP subsidies 
1995-2006 / GDP 1995
(euro/inhabit.) (euro/agr. empl.) (%) (%)
Below 
Cut-off point 
56 regions 2,435 56,308 22.50 18.10
only Ob. 1 regions 2,783 56,039 25.80 19.30
Above 
Cut-off point 
148 regions 107 68,863 0.62 6.88
only non Ob. 1 regions 0 67,672 0 6.10
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from one side at the limited amount of resources allocated 
to these regions, and from the other at the eligibility crite-
ria of Objective 2 areas: although the ‘regionalised’ target, 
it differs among different regions and countries because the 
eligibility depends on a population ceiling and other specifi c 
criteria. This means that the socio-economic conditions are 
not uniform across eligible EU regions.
Contrary to expectations, CAP subsidies have a posi-
tive impact on the convergence process little bit higher than 
Objective 1 funds. This result is not a foregone conclusion. 
In absolute terms the highest CAP subsidies refer to regions 
outside Objective 1, where the impact of the CAP subsi-
dies on economic growth at territorial level may be almost 
irrelevant when we consider only the primary sector. On the 
other hand this result confi rms the fi ndings of Montresor and 
Pecci (2008) but also gives new and important indications 
about the interpretation of the effects of CAP subsidies. If the 
analysis moves to the complex system of interdependencies 
between agriculture and the food industry, it can be inferred 
that the impact of CAP subsidies may be positive also for 
the less developed economies, as the increasing relation-
ships allow a better exploitation of agricultural production. 
We could here recall a sort of ‘big push’ due to the indirect 
effect of CAP subsidies on less developed economies: the 
spatial spillovers exerted by (not necessarily poor) regions 
may help the other regional economies to overcome defi cien-
cies in private incentives that prevent fi rms from adopting 
modern production techniques and achieving scale econo-
mies. As a consequence the effects of CAP subsidies are not 
only restricted to the rural and agricultural sector, but they 
affect the entire economy.
In light of these results, the recent EC budget proposal 
(EC, 2011) to not signifi cantly reduce the resources for the 
CAP from 2014 to 2020 and to propose a change designed to 
lead to a fairer and more equal system of support across the 
EU and to ensure a more equal distribution of direct support, 
suggests that, in the future, these positive effects on growth 
processes of EU regions will be further developed.
It can also be assumed that in less economically advanced 
regions (to follow Cappelen et al., 2003) the CAP subsidies, 
even if smaller, since the agri-food sector is important in 
their economies, have been a signifi cant support to economy 
of those regions.
Under a methodological profi le the spatial econometric 
technique used in our study allows a clear progress for ana-
lysing the convergence process and the estimation of local 
β-convergence rates. This technique permits, inter alia, 
examining the convergence process without identifying a 
priori the type of convergence, i.e. conditional or conver-
gence clubs. As a consequence, for the interpretation of the 
results, beside the structure of the economies, we must take 
into account the existence of spatial interactions related to 
spatial weights matrix. In addition to the SF impact, in fact, 
there are the effects induced in the economies of each region 
from the economies of surrounding regions.
Finally, these results show that the path for analysing the 
economic convergence in the EU is still long. In particular, 
doubts about the ability of the SF to ensure sustainable eco-
nomic growth and to reduce the gaps between centre and 
periphery of Europe still seem to be well founded.
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Appendix
The EU NUTS 2 regions in the sample.
NUTS β model 1 (%)
β model 2 
(%)
AT11 -6.32 -3.90
AT12 -6.76 -4.09
AT13 -7.53 -4.35
AT21 -3.32 -2.71
AT22 -4.10 -3.11
AT31 -3.41 -2.92
AT32 -3.26 -2.64
AT33 -3.58 -1.81
AT34 -2.59 -2.01
BE10 -2.57 -5.38
BE21 -1.93 -3.27
BE22 -1.72 -1.63
BE23 -0.79 -3.51
BE24 -2.91 -5.68
BE25 -0.50 -2.97
BE31 -2.77 -5.25
BE32 -1.28 -3.54
BE33 -1.64 -1.33
BE34 -1.58 -1.56
BE35 -1.86 -2.86
DE11 -2.43 -2.10
DE12 -2.17 -1.72
DE13 -2.00 -1.77
DE14 -2.48 -2.03
DE21 -3.05 -2.46
DE22 -2.91 -2.95
DE23 -2.60 -3.17
DE24 -2.36 -3.26
DE25 -2.52 -2.73
DE26 -2.28 -2.28
DE27 -2.76 -2.23
DE30 0.74 -5.63
DE41 0.48 -5.04
DE42 -0.20 -4.95
DE50 -1.30 -0.83
DE60 -0.82 -0.24
DE71 -2.20 -1.52
DE72 -2.12 -1.43
DE73 -2.01 -1.74
DE80 -1.18 -2.82
DE91 -1.65 -2.10
DE92 -1.49 -1.05
DE93 -0.91 -0.32
DE94 -1.14 -0.66
DEA1 -1.44 -0.57
DEA2 -1.59 -0.74
DEA3 -1.34 -0.62
DEA4 -1.65 -1.07
DEA5 -1.70 -0.97
DEB1 -1.75 -1.05
DEB2 -1.55 -0.89
DEB3 -1.93 -1.37
DEC0 -1.62 -1.12
NUTS β model 1 (%)
β model 2 
(%)
DED1 -1.82 -4.30
DED2 -1.60 -3.56
DED3 -1.46 -5.03
DEE1 -1.36 -4.74
DEE2 -1.74 -4.03
DEE3 -1.53 -3.19
DEF0 -1.07 -0.80
DEG0 -2.02 -3.24
DK -1.45 -1.53
ES11 -0.81 -2.48
ES12 -1.11 -2.52
ES13 -1.36 -2.70
ES21 -1.42 -3.06
ES22 -1.66 -2.97
ES23 -1.52 -3.09
ES24 -2.08 -2.69
ES30 -2.39 -2.76
ES41 -1.58 -2.67
ES42 -2.60 -2.70
ES43 -1.89 -2.55
ES51 -2.07 -2.52
ES52 -2.46 -2.57
ES53 -1.96 -2.37
ES61 -2.16 -2.49
ES62 -2.49 -2.52
FI13 -1.70 1.87
FI18 -1.69 3.93
FI19 -1.68 3.93
FI1A -1.69 1.21
FI20 -1.65 0.75
FR10 -1.22 -2.50
FR21 -1.47 -2.19
FR22 -0.85 -2.69
FR23 -1.78 -2.23
FR24 -1.61 -2.40
FR25 -1.96 -2.07
FR26 -1.57 -2.24
FR30 -0.53 -2.86
FR41 -1.57 -1.57
FR42 -1.82 -1.62
FR43 -1.69 -1.98
FR51 -1.82 -2.25
FR52 -1.62 -2.06
FR53 -1.81 -2.43
FR61 -1.86 -2.56
FR62 -1.98 -2.55
FR63 -1.80 -2.48
FR71 -1.75 -2.22
FR72 -1.76 -2.41
FR81 -1.91 -2.44
FR82 -1.78 -2.24
FR83 -1.48 -2.27
GR11 -1.88 -2.02
NUTS β model 1 (%)
β model 2 
(%)
GR12 -1.98 -2.03
GR13 -1.97 -2.08
GR14 -2.30 -1.99
GR21 -1.88 -2.13
GR22 -1.93 -2.14
GR23 -2.45 -2.01
GR24 -2.53 -1.95
GR25 -2.41 -2.00
GR30 -2.26 -1.98
GR41 -1.92 -2.00
GR42 -1.82 -2.04
GR43 -1.88 -2.06
IE01 4.13 -2.78
IE02 3.73 -2.68
ITC1 -1.91 -2.15
ITC2 -1.89 -2.12
ITC3 -1.84 -2.16
ITC4 -2.23 -2.01
ITD1 -3.75 -1.61
ITD2 -3.28 -1.66
ITD3 -2.73 -1.94
ITD4 -2.85 -2.38
ITD5 -1.79 -2.13
ITE1 -1.13 -2.32
ITE2 0.73 -2.88
ITE3 0.57 -2.87
ITE4 0.93 -3.00
ITF1 1.81 -3.38
ITF2 2.65 -3.78
ITF3 2.62 -3.83
ITF4 3.07 -4.18
ITF5 3.54 -4.35
ITF6 0.91 -3.25
ITG1 -0.43 -2.68
ITG2 -1.39 -2.31
LU -1.51 -1.08
NL11 -0.01 0.60
NL12 -0.79 -0.42
NL13 0.17 0.95
NL21 -0.43 0.29
NL22 -1.08 -0.48
NL23 -1.00 -0.58
NL31 -1.26 -1.22
NL32 -1.24 -1.38
NL33 -1.26 -2.18
NL34 -0.87 -2.99
NL41 -1.55 -1.72
NL42 -1.58 -0.98
PT11 -0.87 -2.53
PT11 -0.87 -2.53
PT15 -2.07 -2.51
PT15 -2.07 -2.51
NUTS β model 1 (%)
β model 2 
(%)
PT16 -1.38 -2.55
PT16 -1.38 -2.55
PT17 -1.97 -2.58
PT17 -1.97 -2.58
PT18 -2.08 -2.63
PT18 -2.08 -2.63
SE01 -1.62 0.39
SE01 -1.62 0.39
SE02 -1.59 -0.39
SE04 -1.50 -1.83
SE06 -1.60 -0.75
SE07 -1.63 -0.73
SE08 -1.67 -0.11
SE09 -1.55 -1.39
SE0A -1.55 -1.52
UKC1 -4.14 -3.52
UKC2 -4.58 -3.59
UKD1 -3.29 -3.63
UKD2 -1.18 -3.55
UKD3 -1.07 -3.74
UKD4 -1.78 -4.12
UKD5 -1.45 -3.91
UKE1 -1.46 -1.70
UKE2 -1.84 -2.70
UKE3 1.14 -1.39
UKE4 -0.19 -2.39
UKF1 0.79 -1.09
UKF2 -2.06 -0.99
UKF3 -1.88 -1.43
UKG1 -2.74 -0.51
UKG2 -1.80 -1.84
UKG3 -2.44 -0.60
UKH1 -3.11 -1.66
UKH2 -2.79 -1.49
UKH3 -3.60 -1.66
UKI1 -1.01 -2.78
UKI2 -1.00 -2.79
UKJ1 -3.20 -0.88
UKJ2 -2.56 -1.81
UKJ3 -3.12 -1.06
UKJ4 -3.23 -1.81
UKK1 -2.85 -0.76
UKK2 -2.15 -1.21
UKK3 -0.71 -1.89
UKK4 -0.95 -1.67
UKL1 -0.88 -1.90
UKL2 -1.36 -1.86
UKM1 -3.79 -3.12
UKM2 -4.33 -3.54
UKM3 -3.37 -3.38
UKM4 -2.97 -2.99
UKN0 1.65 -2.75
